For many years, institutional psychiatry was a major tool in the suppression of political dissent. Moreover it appears painfully clear that, while the worst excesses of the past have mostly disappeared, the problem is not limited to the pages of history. What is more, the revelations of the worst of these abuses (and the concomitant rectification of many of them
patient's condition, and the concern of family and friends generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be corrected. It is not true that the release of a genuinely mentally ill person is no worse for the individual than the failure to convict the guilty. One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. It cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to "go free" than for a mentally normal person to be committed.'
Yet, if we are to consider the well-documented history of the use of state psychiatry in the Soviet bloc and in China, we are forced to confront the reality that, for many years, procedural safeguards such as these were totally absent, and institutional psychiatry was a major tool in the suppression of political dissent. 4 Moreover, it appears painfully clear that, while the worst excesses of the past have mostly disappeared, 5 the problem is not limited to the pages of history. What is more, the revelations of the worst of these abuses (and the concomitant rectification of many of them) may, paradoxically, have created the false illusion that all the major problems attendant to questions of institutional treatment and conditions in these nations have been solved. This is decidedly not so.'
Remarkably, the issue of the human rights of persons with mental disabilities had been ignored for decades by the international agencies vested with the protection of Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418. 429-430 (1979) ; see generally I MICHAEL L. PERLIN: MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2C-5.1a, at 395-400 (2nd ed. 1998) . 1 critique what I characterize as the "pretextual assumptions" of Addington in MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 95-96 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, THP] . On the meaning of"pretextuality" in this context, see infra Part V. 4 As Richard Bonnie explains:
human rights on a global scale. 7 Dr. Theresa Degener, a noted disability scholar and activist, thus observed that "drafters of the International Bill of Human Rights [IHBR] did not include disabled persons as a distinct group vulnerable to human rights violations," and that "none of the equality clauses of any of the three instruments of [the IHBR] mention disability as a protected category." ' Degener's writings reflect the change that has taken place in disability rights jurisprudence. In 2000, she stated further that "disability has been reclassified as a human rights issue," and that "law reforms in this area are intended to provide equal opportunities for disabled people and to combat their segregation, institutionalization and exclusion as typical forms of disability-based discrimination.' 9 To some extent, this new interest in human rights protections for people with disabilities tracks a larger international movement to protect human rights, 9 and appears to more precisely track C. Raj Kumar's observation that "the judicial protection of human rights and constitutionalization of human rights may be two important objectives by which the rule of law can be preserved and which may govern future human rights work."'I
Within the legal literature, it appears that the first time disability rights was conceptualized as a human ights issue was as recently as 1993 when, in a groundbreaking article, Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein first applied international human rights principles to the institutionalization of people with mental disabilities. 12 This article was relied on almost immediately by scholars and activists Experts 'Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13-17, 1999 , 18 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 180, 187 (2000 . The three instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) studying the human rights implications of mental disability laws in Japan 13 and in
Uruguay.
14 For people with mental disabilities, in particular, the development of human rights protections may be even more significant than for people with other disabilities. Like people with other disabilities, people with mental disabilities face degradation, stigmatization, and discrimination throughout the world today.
5 But unlike people with other disabilities, many people with mental disabilities are routinely confined, against their will, in institutions, and deprived of their freedom, dignity, and basic human rights. People with mental disabilities who are fortunate enough to live outside of institutions often remain imprisoned by the social isolation they experience, often from their own families. They are not included in educational programs, and they face attitudinal barriers to employment because they have not received the education and training needed to obtain employment or because of discrimination based on unsubstantiated fears and prejudice. Only recently have disability discrimination laws and policies in the United States and elsewhere focused on changing such attitudes and promoting the integration of people with disabilities into our schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces. sanism as an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry, that infects jurisprudence and lawyering practices, that is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable, that is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of a false "ordinary common sense" and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.
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And I define pretextuality as the ways in which courts accept-either implicitly or explicitly-testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest and frequently meretricious decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends. 18 I do not believe we can make any sense of the phenomena that are at the heart of this paper without seriously considering the pernicious impact of sanism and pretextuality on all of mental disability law.
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It is clear that, within the past decade, there has been an explosion of interest in the area of human rights and mental disability law 2 --by academics, practitioners, See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Things Have Changed: Looking at Non-institutional -Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter 46 N.YL. ScH. L. REV. 535, 539 (2002 -2003 The question remains, however: to what extent has institutional, state-sponsored psychiatry been used as a tool of political suppression, and what are the implications of this pattern and practice? Even though the worst excesses of Soviet-sanctioned political suppression came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the problem remains a serious one in other nations (most importantly, China). Just as important, the pervasive impact of sanism and pretextuality continue to, globally, contaminate public psychiatric practice. This contamination is particularly corrosive because the dramatic and well-publicized cessation of the Soviet bloc'spolitical abuses have lulled us into a false consciousness through which we inaccurately believe that the underlying problems have disappeared. They have not.
This Article will proceed in the following manner In Part II, I will discuss the first revelations of the "dehumanization" referred to by Professor Alexander. In Part III, I will discuss developments after these revelations were publicized. In Part IV, I will weigh the extent to which the post-revelation reforms have been effective and meaningful. In Part V, I will elaborate upon the meanings of "sanism "and "pretextuality," and discuss how they relate to the topic at hand. Then, in Part VI, I
will raise questions that have not yet been answered, and that, I believe, should help set the research agendas of those thinking about these important issues.
II. The First Revelations
The history of the use of institutional psychiatry as a political tool was documented by Michel Foucault 40 years ago. 23 REV. 20, 21 (2004) . See also Bonnie, supra note 4, at 140. "The Soviet experience was significant because it provided a vivid illustration of the risks associated with unchecked psychiatric power, and the importance of erecting institutional safeguards to minimize these risks in the context of involuntary hospitalization and neatment." 3 Bloch and Reddaway explain that Soviet psychiatrists who rendered such diagnoses (referred to as "core psychiatrists") received many contingent benefits for cooperating with the authorities:
The rewards of the good life include access to a variety of privileges and benefits not available to ordinary Soviet citizens. The core psychiatrist is likely to travel abroad, as a tourist or as an attendant at a conference, to have access to stores selling luxury goods at moderate prices, to have a country cottage, and to take vacations at special sanatoria. Their salaries are about three times higher in real terms than those of ordinary psychiatrists.
BLOCH & REDDAWAY, supra note 27, at 322. Iss. 279, 279 (1999 Under applicable laws of Russia and the other former Soviet Republics, a person charged with crime could be subjected to custodial measures of a medical nature if the criminal act was proven and the person was found non-imputable due to mental illness. 40 Non-imputable offenders could be placed in maximum security hospitals (the notorious special hospitals) or in ordinary hospitals depending on their social dangerousness.
'
The delegation found that no clinical basis existed for the judicial finding of non-imputability in seventeen of these cases. In fact, the delegation found no evidence of mental disorder of any kind in fourteen cases. In all likelihood, these individuals are representative of many hundreds of others who were found nonimputable for crimes of political or religious dissent in the U.S.S.R., mainly between 1970 and 1990.42 Glumly, Bonnie and Polubinskaya concluded that this repressive use of psychiatry in Russia was made "inevitable 43 by the "communist regime's intolerance for dissent, including any form of political or religious deviance, and by the corrosive effects of corruption and intimidation in all spheres of social life. '44 On this point, they indicted "a subset of Soviet psychiatrists 4 [who] knowingly collaborated with the KGB to subject mentally healthy dissidents to psychiatric punishment, in blatant violation of professional ethics and human rights. '46 In this respect, they concluded, "abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union had less to do with psychiatry per se than with the repressiveness of the political regime of which the psychiatrists were a part.1 The roots of the problem lie much deeper in the attitudes and training of Soviet psychiatrists, and in the role of psychiatry in Soviet society. Repression of political and religious dissidents was only the most overt symptom of an authoritarian system of psychiatric care in which an expansive and elastic view of mental disorder encompassed all forms of unorthodox thinking, and in which psychiatric diagnosis was essentially an exercise of social power.
Indeed, "psychiatry was a state institution," and "the social prestige of psychiatrists lay almost entirely in their role as agents of social control, and psychiatrists were more closely aligned with the police than with other specialties in medicine.1
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More recent studies of other Soviet bloc nations revealed similar patterns of behavior. Krassimir Kanev, Bulgaria's leading human rights activist, has noted, "Observations show that in the absence of an accurate definition of 'danger,' Propaganda of a Fascist nature and propaganda against the socialist state, committed by any means in public, is punished by a sentence of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years and the forfeiture of certain rights. Propaganda or the undertaking of any action with the aim of changing the Socialist system or activities which could result in a threat to the security of the state will be punished by a sentence of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years and the forfeiture of certain rights.
Article 245 provided:
Entering or leaving the country through illegal crossing of the frontier will be punished by a sentence of imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years. The acquisition of means or One psychiatrist in Romania, interviewed for this article, explained why, in his opinion, this had to be true:
Under Ceaucescu, political opponents could not exist.... In Ceaucescu's time, there was a man who said in the street with a banner, "Down with Ceaucescu." Strictly professionally speaking, it was difficult to believe that this was a real political opinion because it was so obvious that no one would allow him to express himself, so he had to be delusional and couldn't adjust. Real political opposition [sic] were subversive.2 Romania's characterization of individuals attempting to flee as mentally ill criminals reflected the former Soviet view that crossing the border is a sign of mental illness, as is distributing religious leaflets." Reliance on such behaviors as the basis for a diagnosis of mental illness is problematic for both the patient and the psychiatrist. As Ochberg and Gunn have explained:
The psychiatrist has a dilemma. If he accepts society's definition of madness without using his own separate criteria, he becomes a depository for all sorts ofproblems unrelated to medicine and he risks becoming an agent of society for the enforcement of contemporary mores. On the other hand, if he takes the opposite view to extremes, he ends up by refusing to treat any patient whose only symptoms are behavioral and who does not show organic changes. 4 This state of affairs is not and was not limited to Russia and the Soviet Bloc. Robin Munro's monumental study of state psychiatry in China paints an equally bleak picture. Munro charged that Chinese state psychiatry engaged in what he characterized as hyper-diagnosis, or "the excessively broad clinical determination of instruments of the undertaking of measures from which it unequivocally follows that the offender intends to cross the frontier illegally will also be regarded as an attempt. a tendency on the part of forensic psychiatrists to diagnose as severely mentally ill, and therefore legally non-imputable for their alleged offenses, certain types of dissident or nonconformist detainees who were perceived by the police as displaying a puzzling 'absence of instinct for self-preservation 'when staging peaceful political protests, expressing officially banned views, pursuing legal complaints against corrupt or repressive officialdom, etc. Munro characterized another category of politically motivated ethical abuse that found in China as "severe medical neglect," resulting in "numerous mentally ill individuals being sent to prison as political 'counter-revolutionaries' and then denied all medical or psychiatric care for many years in an environment bound only to worsen their mental condition.
' 5 7 Here, he charged that China engaged in "the deliberate withholding of such care from political offenders whom the authorities had already clearly diagnosed as being mentally ill."" Munro drew on empirical studies showing that of 222 cases examined in which diagnoses of schizophrenia were made, there were fifty-five cases of a political nature, and forty-eight cases involving "disturbances of social order."
59 From these statistics (comparing them to the cohort of those diagnosed with serious mental illness who had been charged with violent felonies), Munro concluded that "so-called political cases and also those involving disturbance of public order are evidently seen by China's legal-medical authorities as representing no less serious and dangerous a threat to society than cases of murder and injury committed by genuinely psychotic criminal offenders." The MI Principles also protect a broad array of rights within institutions, including protections against harm, "including unjustified medication, abuse by other patients, staff, or others...," and require the establishment of monitoring and inspection of facilities to ensure compliance with the Principles. They require treatment "based on an individually prescribed plan," and they require that "[t]he treatment of every patient shall be directed towards preserving and enhancing personal autonomy." The MI Principles establish substantive standards and procedural protections against arbitrary detention in a psychiatric facility. Article 5-Right to Liberty and Security:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment (sic) of any obligation prescribed by law; c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; mental hospital, but leaving the term undefined. 7 6 In one of the leading European civil commitment cases, however, the European Court of Human rights has said specifically this Article would not permit the detention of a person simply because "his views or behaviour deviate from the norms prevailing in a particular society.""
In short, the promulgation of the MI principles has the potential to be an important bulwark against the sort of governmental misconduct that is exemplified by the Soviet experience. This does not answer the question, however, of whether that potential has been fulfilled.
IV. Law-in-Action vs. Law-on-the-Books: Have the Revelations Led to Meaningful
Change?
The dichotomy between "law on the books" and "law in action," is a gap that has plagued American mental disability law since it began. Cases are decided on the Supreme Court level, yet are not implemented in the states. The United States Supreme Court has articulated sophisticated doctrine, for example, by mandating dangerousness as a prerequisite for an involuntary civil commitment finding, yet trial courts ignore that doctrine. The Supreme Court has issued elaborate guidelines to be used in cases of criminal defendants who will likely never regain their competence e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. To what extent does this same gap continue in the nations that are the subject of this paper? Regrettably, conditions in many Eastern European facilities are still so substandard as to violate fundamental international human rights. Consider first a report by Amnesty International condemning conditions in Romanian psychiatric hospitals:
Many of the people placed in psychiatric wards and hospitals throughout the country apparently do not suffer an acute mental disorder and many do not require psychiatric treatment. Their placement in psychiatric hospitals cannot be justified by the provisions of the Law on Mental Health and they should also be considered as people who have been arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. They had been placed in the hospital on non-medical grounds, apparently solely because they could not be provided with appropriate support and services to assist them and/or their families in the community. Often, because of their disability they are more vulnerable to abuse, which apparently is not taken into consideration by hospital staff as in most places such residents were not segregated from people who have different needs for care."
Similarly, when Amnesty International investigated conditions in Bulgaria, it documented cases of women locked in a cage outside one institution. The cage was full of urine and feces and the women covered in filth. One woman was unclothed on the lower half of her body and many sores were visible on her skin. The challenge for the international psychiatric community now is to find ways of exerting its influence to ensure that China's secretive... system and other custodial psychiatric facilities around the country can no longer be used by the security authorities as a long-term dumping ground for political and religious nonconformists who, for one reason or another, they find it awkward or inconvenient to bring to criminal trial.... Advocacy efforts by local and international psychiatric bodies would also greatly assist in encouraging individual Western governments and the European Union to take up the issue, notably by placing the issue of political psychiatric abuse people with mental disabilities live in some of the harshest conditions that exist in any society. 93 As previously noted, these conditions are the product of neglect, lack of legal protection against improper and abusive treatment, and primarily, the social attitudes of sanism and pretextuality."
In the past, I have written regularly about these attitudes in domestic contexts so as to "seek to expose their pernicious power, the ways in which [they] infect judicial decisions, legislative enactments, administrative directives, jury behavior, and public attitudes, the ways that these factors undercut any efforts at creating a unified body 9 See e.g., Winick, supra note 49, at 538 (discussing current conditions in facilities in Hungary, and concluding that they are "reminiscent of the state of American mental health facilities thirty-five or more years ago" (and see also id.: "many diagnosed as mentally disabled are permanently institutionalized in Hungarian psychiatric facilities, although perhaps 50% of them could live safely in the community with suitable care."). of mental disability law jurisprudence, and the ways that these factors contaminate scholarly discourse and lawyering practices alike." 95 There is no longer any question in my mind that these same factors infect international mental disability law practice in the same ways that they infect domestic practice.
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In a recent manuscript, I concluded that an examination of comparative mental disability law revealed at least five dominant, universal, core factors 9 7 that reflected "the shame that the worldwide state of mental disability law brings to all of us who work in this field. Each is tainted by the pervasive corruption of sanism that permeates all of mental disability law. Each reflects a blinding pretextuality that contaminates legal practice in this area."" This same sanism is, in great part, to blame for the societal disinterest that allows the conditions discussed here to fester.
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(1) Lack of comprehensive legislation to govern the commitment and treatment of persons with mental disabilities, and failure to adhere to legislative mandates; (2) Lack of independent counsel and lack of consistent judicial review mechanisms made available to persons facing commitment and those institutionalized; (3) A failure to provide humane care to institutionalized persons; (4) Lack of coherent and integrated community programs as an alternative to institutional care, and (5) Failure to provide humane services to forensic patients. See PERLIN, supra note 7, at ch. 8. 9 Perlin, supra note 6, at manuscript at 1.
The United Nations has recently published a Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
99 that would "give disability rights organizations a specific tool for promoting human rights for persons with disabilities in domestic contexts and to their own government."' '° That Convention would not necessarily be a full palliative for the problems discussed in this paper, but it would certainly be a step in the right direction.
VI. Unanswered Questions
In their analysis of the Russian experience, Bonnie and Polubinskaya summed up their findings in this manner:
At bottom, the human rights problem raised by these prosecutions is the criminalization of dissent; repression of dissent is problematic whether the dissenter is sent to jail or to a psychiatric hospital. However, it would be a mistake to regard the hospitalization of dissidents as only a derivative problem. To hospitalize a dissenter who is not mentally ill on grounds of non-imputability combines repression with moral fraud and magnifies the violation of human rights; it demeans the dissenter's dignity, devalues his or her message and establishes the legal authority for an indeterminate period of what can only be called psychiatric punishment.
1
What is clear now is that the heroic exposes discussed in this Paper-while having a major impact on the political use of psychiatry in Russia and the Soviet bloc nations -have not solved many of the underlying problems. As Robin Munro's work teaches us, psychiatric hospitalization. And, moreover, the amelioration of conditions in Russia, while certainly more than cosmetic, have done little or nothing to improve the plight of those persons institutionalized for non-political reasons in many of the former Soviet bloc nations.
1 03 I believe that the universality of sanism is, in large part, responsible for this situation. In short, the publicity and attention that focused on the political misuses of state psychiatry resulted in discrete amelioration in one area (the treatment of psychiatric "political prisoners" in Russia). But this amelioration did not extend to: 1) "political prisoners" elsewhere, and, 2) non-political residents of state psychiatric facilities in these same nations.
Having said this, I believe that this overview leaves many unanswered questions.
I will briefly address them in the hopes that they will now be added to others' research agendas. First, has the political use of psychiatry is (or has been) limited to nations with a history of totalitarian governments?
It should not surprise anyone that there is also a history of such political use of psychiatry in the United States against important political and cultural figures. Ezra Pound, Alger Hiss, -General Walker and others were removed from public prominence through hospitalization. Second, If the excesses described by Profs. Bonnie and Polubinskaya have substantially ceased, do admissions to psychiatric institutions in the former Soviet Union now comport with due process?
A recent case in the Soviet Republic of Karelia suggests that this is far from so." 6 There, a local court found that a patient, one who had spent nearly two months in the case of China, the international community does not appear to be willing to press the regime on human rights, and therefore the path toward ending political abuse will not be through political liberalization."
'1 4 A recent expose in the New York Times tells us that the use of state psychiatry as a tool of political repression continues unabated in China.1 5 This is, in short, not a problem that has disappeared since Bonnie expressed pessimism on this subject some six years ago.
Fourth, if all nations provided top-flight legal services to persons institutionalized because of mental disability, would these problems disappear?
The development of mental disability law in the United States tracks-inexorably and almost absolutely-the availability of appointed counsel to persons facing commitment to psychiatric institutions, to those being treated in such institutions, and to those seeking release fiom such institutions."
6 Without the availability of such counsel, it is virtually impossible to imagine the existence of the bodies of involuntary civil commitment law, right to treatment law, right to refuse treatment law, or any aspect of forensic mental disability law that are now taken for granted." 7 Similarly, especially in the area of involuntary civil commitment law, the presence of regular and on-going judicial review has served as a bulwark of protection against arbitrary state action."' Put simply, none of these protections-accessible, free counsel, and regular judicial review-is present in most of the world's mental disability law systems."' It is rare for even minimal access to counsel to be statutorily (or judicially) mandated, and, even where counsel is legislatively ordered, it is rarely provided. Moreover, the lack of meaningful judicial review makes the commitment hearing system little more than a meretricious pretext. The task, as Professor Bonnie has indicated, is "dautming,"" 2 0 and the absence of these safeguards suggest that promises of authentic reform may, in practice, still be largely illusory.
Fifth, to what extent do these issues "matter" to the political leaders of the nations in question, and to what extent is it likely that the attitudes of such leaders are likely to change?
The revelations of the misuse of state psychiatry in Russia attracted local and world attention in the years soon after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union."' The recent issuance of a report by Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI) excoriating Turkey for its "barbaric" widespread use of electroconvulsive or "shock" treatment (ECT) on psychiatric patients-as young as 9 years old-without the accompanying use of anesthesia 122 has come to be an issue in the debate over that It is extremely important that the EU has raised concerns about the human rights of people with disabilities in Turkey," said Eric Rosenthal, Executive Director of Mental Disability Rights International. "Abuses that take place behind the closed doors of institutions are all too often overlooked by the public and international oversight bodies. By raising these concerns, the EU report ensures that egregious abuses against children and adults with mental disabilities will be taken into account as Turkey applies for EU accession. The report, by Mental Disability Rights International, an advocacy group based in Washington, is likely to complicate the EU talks because many European officials are already wary of letting Turkey join the Union and will use any evidence that the country falls short of European standards to argue against its membership. But the authors of the These examples aside, however, this issue certainly does not appear high on the agenda of the most pressing social issues in the nations discussed in this paper, notwithstanding the fact that many of these practices (if not all) appear to be gross violations of international human rights. The two topics on which I have focused in this paper-the political use of state psychiatry and the wretched conditions in which "nonpolitical" individuals are held and treated in state psychiatric facilities-cannot be understood as two discrete and unrelated issues. They are connected in very important ways, and it is critical that we understand that connection.
The Russian state (and other Soviet bloc nations) used (and China continues to use) state psychiatry as a means of silencing dissidents for multiple reasons: so as to allow the state to circumvent the (minimal) procedural safeguards that would have to attend a criminal trial; to allow for indefinite confinement, and to stigmatize and thus discredit potential political threats.
3 2 The very same states treat patients in public psychiatric hospitals in ways that utterly fail to meet minimal standards of human decency, and that violate the MI Principles' by means that avoid procedural safeguards (as to fair hearing and periodic review), 3 4 and freely perpetuate these actions because the persons who are institutionalized are stigmatized as a result of report hope that the pressure will bring a quick end to the worst abuses. "We realized Turkey was a great opportunity for using that process to have some influence," Although these motivations may not be "political" (in the sense that those being mistreated are not necessarily identified as political dissidents or dissenters), 3 ' the outcome of state action is political in that it reflects the state's failure to take seriously the human rights of persons whom it has institutionalized because of mental illness. The recent expose of the unregulated use of ECT in Turkey, (and the impact of that expose on Turkey's aspirations to European Union membership) show us that mistreatment of the non-political remains, at its core, a political act.
Writing in 1993, Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein first illuminated how the MI Principles "come from an individualistic, libertarian perspective that emphasizes restrictions on what the state can do to a person with mental illness." ' 13 A presenter at a conference held at New York Law School on the treatment of persons with mental disabilities referred to this article, and then told the audience, "Without advocates willing to get in the trenches and fight for these ideals, so that they might become a reality for persons with mental disabilities, these treaties and standards remain mere words without action."' 1t This is a goal to which all of us who take this area of law and society seriously should aspire. 
